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Lender Liability for Negligently
Processing Loan Applications
Nan S. Ellis and John A. Gray*
I. Introduction
Purchasing a home is the single most important investment in
most people's lives. When a person applies for a mortgage and pays
the required loan application fee, he expects the lender to process the
application carefully. If, instead, the lender fails to process the appli-
cation in accordance with standard banking practices and the loan is
denied, the applicant might be forced to seek alternative financing.
If, while the lender processes the initial loan application, interest
rates rise dramatically, the costs of the alternative financing could be
substantially more than the costs had the initial application been ap-
proved. The applicant would be understandably angry. Would he or
she, however, have any legal recourse against the lender?
In a case of first impression nationally, Jacques v. First Na-
tional Bank of Maryland,' a unanimous court granted relief to resi-
dential mortgage loan applicants who had been forced to obtain
more expensive alternative financing due to the careless denial of
their application by the first lender. The Jacques court held that the
lender bank had a duty to exercise reasonable care in the processing
of the mortgage loan application.
To the average person, the outcome probably appears obvious
and certainly not shocking. Anyone who applies for a loan assumes
that the lender will consider the application with reasonable care and
will grant the loan to qualified applicants. It might seem reasonable
to require the lender to compensate the loan applicant for a mistake
in determining loan eligibility which causes damages in the form of
higher alternative financing costs. To the banking industry, however,
the potential for liability created by this decision is enormous. Given
the number of residential mortgage transactions processed daily na-
* Nan S. Ellis is an Associate Professor of Law at the Sellinger School of Business and
Management, Loyola College, Maryland. John A. Gray is an Associate Professor of Law at
the Sellinger School of Business and Management.
I. 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756 (1986). While lender liability has been an explosive area
in recent years, see infra notes 3-7 and accompanying text, this is the first case to create
liability for failure to lend money due to negligent processing of the loan application.
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tionwide, the widespread impact of this decision is self-evident. The
impact upon both lender and applicant could be even more substan-
tial since the Jacques rationale may be extended to any loan
transaction.'
Although lenders have been found liable3 to borrowers4 and
third parties" with increasing frequency under so-called lender liabil-
ity theories,6 no prior case extended the concept of lender liability to
create a duty to process a loan application with due care. The pur-
pose of this article is threefold. First, it will outline the common law
treatment of lender liability, specifically the application of both tort
and contract principles to lender liability actions. Second, the article
will examine the Jacques case. Since Jacques imposed tort liability
upon the defendant stemming from a contractual relationship, the
interrelationship between tort and contract law also will be explored.
In particular, the rationale of Jacques will be analyzed in light of
2. Although Jacques addressed a residential mortgage loan, its reasoning may be appli-
cable to any type of loan to any loan customer by any lending institution. See infra note 143
and accompanying text.
3. Several cases illustrate the severity of the risk of liability to lenders. In the landmark
case of State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App. 1984), the court
awarded over $18 million to the plaintiffs upon, among other grounds, fraud, duress and inter-
ference with corporate governance. In K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir.
1985), the court awarded $7.5 million for breach ofthe implied contractual obligation of good
faith and fair dealing. Recently, a federal district court in Maine awarded plaintiffs $15 mil-
lion for intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, and violations of the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Ricci v. Key Bancshares, Inc., 768 F.2d 456 (Ist Cir. 1985).
Perhaps the best example of the risk to banks is the recent case of Scharenberg v. Continental
Illinois Nat'l Bank, 87-00238-CIV-DAVIS. In this case, the court awarded plaintiffs $105
million for breach of contract after the bank refused to extend credit as promised.
4. See, e.g., Flick and Replansky, Liability of Banks to Their Borrowers: Pitfalls and
Protections, 103 BANKING L.J. 220 (1986).
5. The third parties have included the trustee in bankruptcy, third party creditors,
shareholders, and the government.
6. The term "lender liability" applies to situations in which liability is imposed upon a
lender for its conduct with respect to a loan. For commentary discussing the developing area of
lender liability, see Burcat, Environmental Liability of Creditors: Open Season on Banks,
Creditors, and Other Deep Pockets, 103 BANKING L.J. 509 (1986); Chaitman, The Ten Com-
mandments for Avoiding Lender Liability, SECURED LENDER 10 (November 1986); Cohen,
Hazardous Waste: A Threat to the Lender's Environment, 19 U.C.C. L.J. 99 (1986); Douglas-
Hamilton, Creditor Liabilities Resulting from Improper Interference with the Management of
a Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus. LAW. 343 (1975); Ebke and Griffin, Lender Liability
to Debtors: Toward a Conceptual Framework, 40 Sw. L.J 775 (1986); Lundgren, Liability of
a Creditor in a Control Relationship with its Debtor, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 523 (1984); Malloy,
Lender Liability for Negligent Real Estate Appraisals, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 53 (1984);
Weissman, Lender Liability: The Obligation to Act in Good Faith and Deal Fairly, J. CoM.
LENDING 2 (Dec. 1986).
The theories upon which such liability is imposed are unclear and varied. Certain similari-
ties, however, seem to prevail among court decisions attaching liability. Creditor control over
the affairs of the debtor, see infra notes 7, 8, and 32 and accompanying text, and creditor bad
faith, see infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text, are often cited as prerequisites to lender
liability.
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two questions: Is a loan application merely a request to do business,
or is it a contract once it is accepted for processing? Further, it if is
a contract, should it create a concomitant tort duty of care on the
part of the lender? The article concludes that any loan application,
once accepted, should be recognized as a contract but that a con-
comitant tort duty of care is only created in a consumer lending situ-
ation. This article also contends that the Jacques court failed to ade-
quately address the basic differences between contract and tort.
Finally, the article discusses the practical implications for lending
institutions resulting from the Jacques holding.
II. The Common Law of Lender Liability
Since the Jacques decision is a significant development in the
law of lender liability, it is initially useful to briefly outline that de-
veloping area of the law. Common law lender liability' is based upon
either tort or contract.
A. Tort-Based Liability
Plaintiffs have successfully imposed lender liability on the basis
of such tort theories8 as fraud,9 duress, 10 interference with business
7. The cases can be divided into two basic categories: those asserting liability based upon
common law principles, and those asserting liability based upon statutory principles. Liability
has been imposed upon lenders under numerous statutes. For example, the provisions of state
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Acts have been applied to lenders. See, e.g., United States
v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Pa. 1983), affd United States v. Tabor
Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1289 (3d Cir. 1986). Lender control can be evidence of lack of
good faith relevant to a determination of fair consideration. See, e.g., In re Lumber Co., 5
Bankr. 470 (D. Minn. 1980). This can result in avoidance of a transfer to the lender under
state acts or in an avoidance of the lender's claims under the Federal Bankruptcy Act, should
the debtor file bankruptcy. See. e.g., Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th
Cir. 1980). See generally, Alden, Gross and Borowitz, Real Property Foreclosure as a Fraud-
ulent Conveyance: Proposals for Solving the Durrett Problem, 38 Bus. LAW. 605 (1983);
Coppel and Kann, Defanging Durrett: The Established Law of "'Transfer", 100 BANKING L.J.
676 (1983). Similarly, lenders have found their claims defeated in bankruptcy under grounds
of equitable subordination. II U.S.C. § 5 10(c) (1982). See, e.g., Chaitman, The Equitable
Subordination of Bank Claims, 39 Bus. LAW. 1561 (1984). In addition, liability has been
successfully asserted against lenders based upon violations of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq. (1982). See, e.g., Norman v.
Itex Corp., No. 84-C-421 (E.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 1986), cited in ABA IV Emerging Theories of
Lender Liability (1987); Securities Acts, and the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. §§ 3505(a)
and (b) (1982). See generally Lundgren, supra note 6, at 546-49. Finally, an area of increas-
ing liability for lenders is the area of hazardous waste disposal. See generally Cohen, Hazard-
ous Waste: A Threat to the Lender's Environment, 19 U.C.C. L.J. 99 (1986).
8. It should be noted that cases imposing tort liability generally utilize traditional tort
theories. The prima facie tort is an exception to this generalization. Under this theory, a plain-
tiff recovers when he is injured by an otherwise lawful action that is committed intentionally.
The elements of this tort are: I) an intentional act committed by the defendant; 2) injury to
the plaintiff; 3) intent to injure; and 4) absence of sufficient justification. See, e.g., Porter v.
Crawford & Co., 611 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. App. 1980). But see Luxonomy Cars, Inc. v. Citibank,
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relations," and negligent misrepresentation. 2 In addition, plaintiffs
have attempted, unsuccessfully for the most part, to assert liability
based upon breach of fiduciary duties.1
3
Plaintiffs have also asserted claims against lenders upon negli-
gence grounds, charging both negligent lending and negligent admin-
istration of loans. While these claims have been, by and large, un-
successful,"' they provide a useful framework within which to
examine the Jacques decision.
Courts appear to be unwilling to attach liability to a lender for
negligently lending money, absent active participation "in the fi-
65 A.D.2d 549, 408 N.Y.S.2d 951 (1978). The Jacques plaintiffs asserted the prima facie tort
as a basis for liability, but they later dismissed the cause of action voluntarily. Thus, the issue
was not discussed by either appellate court.
Although the theories are standard, their application to the facts is unique. In most cases,
courts place substantial emphasis on the control the lender exerts over the borrower. For exam-
ple, in State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App. 1984), the loan
documentation contained a management change clause which provided that any change in the
borrower's management that the lender believed adverse to its interests constituted a default.
See generally Lundgren, supra note 6. See also Ebke and Griffin, supra note 6, at 791-95;
Schechter, The Principal Principle: Controlling Creditors Should be Held Liable for Their
Debtor's Obligations, 19 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 875 (1986).
9. See, e.g., Stirling v. Chemical Bank, 382 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 516
F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1975); State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App.
1984).
10. See, e.g., State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App. 1984).
II. Id.
12. See, e.g., Berkline Corp. v. Bank of Mississippi, 453 So.2d 699 (Miss. 1984).
13. As a general rule, lenders do not owe fiduciary duties to their borrowers. See, e.g., In
re W.T. Grant Co., 4 Bankr. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affid 699 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1983); Wash-
ington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1979). See generally Note, Bank
Financing of Involuntary Takeovers of Corporate Customers: A Breach of a Fiduciary Duty?,
53 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 827 (1978) [hereinafter Note, Bank Financing]; Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d
1344 (1976). It seems evident that with respect to loan negotiation and work-out, the relation-
ship between the lender and the borrower is more arms-length than fiduciary. Certain excep-
tions, however, merit notation. Banks owe a fiduciary duty to their depositors to disclose cer-
tain information. See, e.g., Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank, 163 Cal.
App.3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985). See also Barrett v. Bank of America, 178 Cal.
App.3d 960, - Cal. Rptr. - (1986) (fiduciary relationship gives rise to a duty on the
part of the bank to disclose to its borrower any facts which would give the bank an advantage).
Banks are also under a fiduciary duty to preserve the confidentiality of information included on
a loan application. See, e.g., Djowharzadeh v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 646 P.2d 616,
619 (Okla. App. 1982). This duty also requires that the bank refrain from use of such confi-
dential information to aid one customer in a takeover attempt of another customer. See, e.g.,
American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 475 F. Supp. 5 (N.D.
II1. 1977); Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., 1977-78 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) Para.
96,286 at 92,827 (court refused to find a per se violation merely because the bank financed
customer #2's take-over attempt of customer #1 while in possession of confidential information
furnished by customer #1).
14. See infra notes 15-25 and accompanying text. For discussion of a related issue, see
Comment, Is the Account Good For This Check? Bank Liability for Negligent Responses to
Credit Inquiries, ANN. REV. BANKING L. 165 (1983), in which the author discusses bank lia-
bility to third parties stemming from negligent treatment of credit inquiries.
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nanced enterprise beyond the domain of the usual money lender."'"
In Gries v. First Wisconsin National Bank,16 plaintiff-borrowers
sued the bank, alleging that the bank was negligent in lending them
money to establish a retail business which subsequently failed. The
court rejected plaintiffs' theory. Although the discussion focused
more upon whether the standard of care17 was breached,' 8 the court
found that the lender owed no duty of care 9 to the borrowers. The
fact that there was no lender control or participation in the debtor's
business enterprise might have been crucial in reaching this
conclusion .20
In Wagner v. Benson,"' the court again refused to hold the de-
fendant-lender liable for negligence in loaning the plaintiff money.
The court cited the absence of lender control as a crucial factor in
determination. 2 The only court which had imposed tort liability for
negligent lending was Connor v. Great Western Savings and Loan.23
In Connor, the presence of lender participation in the development
plan subjected the lender to liability for the borrower's purchase of
defectively designed and built residential units.24 In addition to the
courts' reluctance to impose liability for negligently lending money
absent participation in the financed enterprise, courts appear to be
equally unwilling to impose liability for negligent administration of a
loan without lender control over the disbursement of the funds. 5
15. Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 35, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521 (1980), quot-
ing Conner v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 864, 447 P.2d 609, 616, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 369, 376 (1968).
16. 82 Wis. 2d 774, 264 N.W.2d 254 (1978).
17. The standard asserted by the plaintiff would require the lender to "exercise that
degree of care and skill which an ordinarily prudent financial institution would exercise under
the circumstances." Id. at 777, 264 N.W.2d at 256.
18. The court held that merely because other financial institutions had denied the loan
and plaintiffs had little business experience did not establish breach of this standard. Id. at
779, 264 N.W.2d at 257.
19. See infra note 78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the elements necessary
to sustain a prima facie case of negligence.
20. Gries v. First Wis. Nat'l Bank, 82 Wis. 2d 774, 780, 264 N.W.2d 254, 257 (1978).
21. 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1980).
22. Id. at 35, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
23. 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969).
24. For a discussion of Connor, see Comment, Liability of the Institutional Lender for
Structural Defects in New Housing, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 739 (1968).
25. See, e.g., Brunswick Bank & Trust Co. v. U.S., 707 F.2d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 676 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In both cases,
courts found the bank negligent in its loan administration because of the control exercised over
the funds. See generally Flick and Replansky, supra note 4, at 232-33.
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B. Contract-Based Liability
The contract doctrine of good faith and fair dealing26 also has
been applied to impose lender liability. This doctrine requires the
lender to act in good faith27 and to deal fairly with its borrowers.2
As a common law doctrine, it is implied in all contracts; it is also an
implied covenant under the Uniform Commercial Code. 9 Courts
have found lenders liable for breach of the obligation of good faith
and fair dealing for refusal to honor lending commitments, s" for re-
fusal to make advances pursuant to an existing agreement,31 for im-
proper use of loan covenants, 32 for improper acceleration, 33 and for
26. While the claims discussed here arise from the covenant of good faith implied in the
contract, some courts have found the lender liable for tortious breach of the contract. See, e.g.,
Alaska Statebank v. FairCo, 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983); Commercial Cotton Co. v. United
Cal. Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985); First Nat'l Bank v. Twombley,
689 P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984). Contra Betterton v. First Interstate Bank, 800 F.2d 732 (8th
Cir. 1986). This can be likened to the trend imposing liability for bad faith breach of con-
tracts. While most courts have limited this application to bad faith breach of insurance con-
tracts, some have expanded the tort to include other contracts with "similar characteristics."
Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 770, 686 P.2d 1158, 1167,
206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 363 (1984). See generally Barrett, "Contort" Tortious Breach of the
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Noninsurance, Commercial Con-
tracts-Its Existence and Desirability, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 510 (1985); Cohen, Recon-
structing Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as a Tort, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 1291 (1985); Curtis, Damage Measurements for Bad Faith Breach of Con-
tract: An Economic Analysis, 39 STAN. L. REV. 161 (1986); Note, Tort Remedies for Breach
of Contract: The Expansion of Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and
Fair Dealing into the Commercial Realm, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 377 (1986).
27. The question, of course, arises as to what constitutes lender good faith. The Uniform
Commercial Code defines good faith as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction con-
cerned." U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1978). There is, however, disagreement over what this standard
entails. See generally Eisenberg, Good Faith Under the Uniform Commercial Code - A New
Look at an Old Problem, 54 MARO. L. REV, 1 (1971); Summers, The General Duty of Good
Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982). At least one
commentator asserts that an objective standard should be imposed to determine good faith in
lender liability cases. Weissman, supra note 6, at I.
28. Weissman, supra note 6, at I. See also Cohen v. Ratinoff, 147 Cal. App. 3d 321,
195 Cal. Rtpr. 84 (1983).
29. This is both a common law and a statutory theory since the common law concept of
good faith and fair dealing applies to all contracts covered by the U.C.C. through § 1-103 and
expressly in § 1-203. U.C.C. §§ 1-103; 1-203 (1978). In addition, the good faith requirement
explicitly applies to acceleration provisions under the terms of U.C.C. § 1-208. Id. at § 1-203.
See also id. at § 1-208.
30. See, e.g., 999 v. C.I.T. Corp., 776 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1985); National Farmers Org.,
Inc. v. Kinsley Bank, 731 F.2d 1464 (10th Cir. 1984); Sterling Faucet Co. v. First Municipal
Leasing Corp., 716 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1983).
31. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985); Yank-
ton Production Credit Ass'n v. Larsen, 219 Neb. 610, 365 N.W.2d 430 (1985).
32. This includes the management change clause in Farah, as well as clauses limiting
the borrower's right to sell the collateral, see supra note 8. See, e.g., Layne v. Fort Carson
Nat'l Bank, 655 P.2d 856 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
33. See, e.g., Sahadi v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 706 F.2d 193 (7th
Cir. 1983); Brown v. Avemco Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979); Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp. v. Shepler, 164 Ind. App. 516, 329 N.E.2d 620 (1975). But see Centerre Bank v.
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improper foreclosure."4
Prior to 1986, the existence of a debtor-creditor relationship had
been clearly established in all lender liability cases. The Maryland
Court of Appeals, however, recently expanded the area of lender lia-
bility in Jacques v. First National Bank of Maryland,3 5 thus expos-
ing lenders to new risks.
III. Jacques v. First National Bank of Maryland
A. The Facts
The Jacques entered into a contract to purchase residential
property for $142,000. The agreement provided for a down payment
of $30,000 and was contingent on the availability of financing the
balance ($112,000) at a rate of no more than 12 /4% interest. It
contained an additional provision obligating the Jacques to increase
the amount of their down payment, if necessary, to obtain a loan at
the rate stated in the agreement.3 6 The agreement also provided for
a $10,000 penalty in the event that the Jacques failed to perform.
The Jacques submitted a loan application, with a copy of the sales
agreement, to First National Bank of Maryland [hereinafter
"lender"] for a loan of $112,000. They paid the $144 fee required by
the lender to cover the cost of the property appraisal and the credit
report. The mortgage rate offered at the time was 11 7/8%.
After processing, a bank officer informed the Jacques that they
qualified for a loan of $74,000. Subsequently, the lender informed
them that it had erred in its original determination of their loan eli-
gibility and that they qualified for a loan of no more than $41,400.
The Jacques protested and requested an outright refusal, but the
lender would not comply.
The Jacques then sought alternate financing. An application
similar to the one provided to First National Bank was submitted to
another institution. This lender issued a commitment for a thirty
year loan in the amount of $100,000. Because of escalating interest
costs, the interest rate offered was 13 7/8%. The Jacques rejected this
offer37 and instead accepted the $41,000 loan offered by First Na-
tional. They supplemented the $41,400 with personal loans from rel-
Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
34. See, e.g., Alaska Statebank v. FairCo, 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983).
35. 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756 (1986).
36. Id. at 529, 515 A.2d at 757. Theoretically, the down payment obligation could in-
crease from $30,000 to any amount less than $142,000.
37. The sales contract did not require the Jacques to accept financing that exceeded 12
1/4% interest. Id. at 530, 515 A.2d at 757.
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atives and a short term $50,000 loan from the defendant lender. The
short term bank loan required a pledge of their personal stock port-
folio and carried a 15% interest rate.
The Jacques then brought suit against the lender on the follow-
ing grounds: 1) breach of fidelity; 8 2) prima facie tort;39 3) mali-
cious interference with contract; 4) gross negligence; and 5) negli-
gence. A directed verdict was entered against the plaintiffs on the
breach of fidelity count, and the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the
claim for prima facie tort. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
defendants on the issues of gross negligence and malicious interfer-
ence with contractual relations, and in favor of the plaintiffs on the
negligence count. 0 On appeal, the defendants only raised the issue
of negligence.
Although several elements comprise the prima facie case for
negligence,"' the major issue at each appellate level was the lender's
duty of care, specifically, whether the defendant-lender owed a duty
of reasonable care"2 to the plaintiffs in processing their loan applica-
tion. The Court of Special Appeals [hereinafter Jacques I],a con-
cluded that it did not; the Court of Appeals [hereinafter Jacques
JJ]4' concluded that it did.
38. Presumably, this is the same as breach of a fiduciary relationship. See supra note 13
and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
40. 307 Md. at 531, 515 A.2d at 757-58. The Jacques originally claimed damages of
$92,000. At trial, the jury awarded $10,000, concluding that plaintiffs could have mitigated
their damages by, at the very least, forfeiting their $10,000 down payment. The Court of
Special Appeals sustained the jury award. The question of the appropriateness of mitigation of
damages under these circumstances is currently being appealed. See Winchurch, Banking De-
cision May Reach Court Again, 39 Daily Record I (Feb. 18, 1987).
41. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
42. If a duty is found, the standard is that of a reasonably prudent banker under similar
circumstances. Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 307 Md. 527, 542-43, 515 A.2d 756, 764 (1986)
(Jacques II). The jury concluded that this standard was breached by the lender's behavior in
processing the loan application in several respects: 1) the lender averaged only two years of the
Jacques' income when three years was common, even though it was aware that the two-year
figures substantially distorted the Jacques financial picture because of illness during the period;
2) the lender included payments on the Jacques' current home in the calculation, although this
was not standard practice; 3) the lender did not consider income from stock; and 4) the loan
officer placed excessive weight on the debt-to-income ratio, rather than balancing that factor
with a favorable credit history and substantial net worth. Id. at 544 n.7, 515 A.2d at 765 n.7.
43. 62 Md. App. 54, 488 A.2d 210 (1985). Absent a duty of care owing to the plaintiff,
it is clear that there can be no liability. See, e.g., Carlotta v. T.R. Stark & Assoc., 57 Md.
App. 457, 470 A.2d 838 (1984); Furr v. Spring Grove State Hospital, 53 Md. App. 474, 454
A.2d 414 (1983).
44. 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756 (1986).
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B. The Court of Special Appeals: Jacques I
The Court of Special Appeals, Maryland's intermediate appel-
late court, held in a 2-1 decision that the lender did not have a duty
to exercise reasonable care in processing the loan application. Each
of the three justices submitted an opinion. Because there was no ma-
jority opinion, each of the three views will be briefly examined.4 5
The court rejected bank liability on the grounds that imposing a
tort duty of care would recognize a duty "in direct conflict with the
long established right of a person to refuse to do business with
others, for nearly any reason or no reason at all."" The opinion re-
lied on earlier case law4 7 and the First Restatement of Torts as au-
thority for the privilege to refuse to enter business relations without
justification. 4" The Restatement nonetheless recognizes certain ex-
ceptions to a person's freedom to select those with whom he will
enter into contractual relations."1 The plaintiffs had contended that a
residential mortgage lender ought to be treated like a public utility,
one of the recognized exceptions. The court disagreed and recog-
nized that although privately owned mortgage lenders are, like pub-
lic utilities, highly regulated, they are, unlike public utilities, highly
competitive. Thus, there was no reason to find lenders within the
public utility exception."'
45. At this point, two judges (the trial judge and the dissenting Court of Special Ap-
peals justice) held in favor of bank liability and two Court of Special Appeals justices opposed
liability (although one was clearly in favor of a law protecting consumers against lender care-
lessness). The end result was no tort liability and no majority opinion.
46. Jacques 1, 62 Md. App. at 60, 488 A.2d at 213.
47. In McCarter v. Chamber of Commerce, 126 Md. 131, 94 A. 541 (1915), the Court
of Appeals stated: "it is a part of every man's legal rights, that he be left at liberty to refuse
business relations with any person whomsoever, whether the refusal rests upon reason, or is the
result of whim, caprice, prejudice, or malice." Id. at 136, 94 A. at 542-43, quoting COOLEY ON
TORTS § 278. See also Silbert v. Ramsey, 301 Md. 96, 482 A.2d 147 (1984); Cunningham v.
A.S. Abell Co., 264 Md. 649, 288 A.2d 157 (1972).
48. Jacques I, 62 Md. App. at 60-65, 488 A.2d at 213-15. The court cited the first
Restatement of Torts § 762 in support of its proposition:
One who causes intended or unintended harm to another merely by refusing
to enter into a business relation with the other or to continue a business relation
terminable at will is not liable for that harm ....
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 762 (1939). The fact that § 762 was not included in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts does not indicate that the provisions of § 762 are no longer the
law. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS reporter comments (1977). Maryland
law clearly follows the Restatement rule. See, e.g., Silbert v. Ramsey, 301 Md. 96, 482 A.2d
147 (1984); Cunningham v. A.S. Abell Co., 264 Md. 649, 288 A.2d 157 (1972).
49. These exceptions are based on the law dealing with public utilities, common carriers,
civil rights, antitrust violations, malicious interference with contractual relations, and conspir-
acy to interfere with contractual relations. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 762(a)-(c)
(1939).
50. Jacques I, 62 Md. App. at 63, 488 A.2d at 214.
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The court reasoned that submitting a loan application was noth-
ing more than a request to do business with the lender. Since the
lender was free to accept or reject such a request for any reason, it
was under no duty to review the request with reasonable care. Where
there is a right to refuse to do business regardless of motive or rea-
son, there is no duty to be careful in making that decision. An exam-
ination of decisions from other jurisdictions supported the decision in
Jacques 51
A second justice concurred in the result but would have found
for the plaintiffs on the breach of fidelity cause of action if raised on
appeal.5" More importantly, the concurring opinion refused to pre-
clude the possibility of recognizing the existence of a duty of care
under certain circumstances.53
The dissenting opinion agreed with the view that accepting and
processing a loan application does not constitute a contract. The dis-
sent, however, would find a duty of care, relying on the principle that
"one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby be-
come subject to the duty of acting carefully,. if he acts at all."54 The
51. Several cases cited in Jacques I merit discussion. In Washington Steel Corp. v. TW
Corp., 602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1979), the Court of Appeals found that a bank had no duty to
refrain from loaning money for a hostile takeover bid to acquire one of the bank's other cus-
tomers. Although the Washington Steel Corp. case dealt with the issue of a fiduciary duty, it
was an indication of the reluctance with which courts impose additional duties upon lenders.
Likewise, two state courts refused to impose a duty where a lender refused to loan money to
the plaintiff. In Deere v. Short, 378 S.W.2d 496 (Mo. 1964), an equipment manufacturer
refused to extend loans to the dealer. The court found no duty to make loans beyond the
provisions of the contractual agreement. Similarly, in Farabee-Treadwell Co. v. Union &
Planters Bank, 135 Tenn. 208, 186 S.W. 92 (1916), the court held that a bank owed no duty
to extend a loan or to continue to do business with a customer.
In a case similar to Jacques, the California Court of Appeals held that a bank did not
owe a duty to exercise care in approving a loan application. Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal. App.
3d 27, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1980). Some crucial facts do, however, distinguish Wagner from
Jacques. In Wagner, the plaintiffs argued that the bank negligently approved their loan. The
plaintiffs then sought to recover losses that were suffered in the business scheme for which the
monies were sought. See also Gries v. First Wis. Nat'l Bank, 82 Wis. 2d 774, 264 N.W.2d 254
(1978).
52. The justice stated: "Additionally, I concur in the result because Maryland law does
not recognize an action for breach of fidelity by a bank, but neither party raises that issue on
appeal. I respectfully suggest that a cause of action for breach of fidelity should exist in Mary-
land ...." Jacques I, 62 Md. App. at 65-66, 488 A.2d at 216.
53. The justice stated:
I do not agree that the case law cited to support the law of duty precludes
entirely the possibility of finding such an obligation in an appropriate case ....
The bank's failure to act in good faith when evaluating the Jacques' financial
status, if believed, could have resulted in an injury that would not have occurred
if the bank followed its standard practice and refused the loan outright. Rather
than denying the loan, the bank acted in bad faith in approving it. By imposing
a duty of care on a bank, consumers would be protected from such procedures.
Id. at 65-67, 488 A.2d at 215-16.
54. Id. at 69, 488 A.2d at 218.
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dissent recognized that this principle, found in the Restatement of
Torts 5 is applicable to personal injury and physical harm situations
and not to situations in which there is only economic loss. It nonethe-
less found this principle persuasive "by analogy. ' '56
The Jacques I dissent discussed First Federal Savings and Loan
Association of Hamilton v. Caudle,5 7 as an illustration of the appli-
cation of this principle in the banking context. In Caudle, a bank
agreed to assist the plaintiffs in obtaining an FHA loan to finance
the construction of their home, even though it had no obligation to
do so. The bank erroneously informed the Caudles that the FHA
had approved the loan. The Caudle court found that once the de-
fendant bank voluntarily agreed to assist the plaintiffs, it was re-
quired to proceed with due care. The Jacques I dissent found this
case controlling. 8 In Jacques, the lender undertook to process the
Jacques' application for a mortgage loan, obtaining the information
necessary to process the application. The dissent reasoned that at
this point, the lender was required to proceed with due care.59 Fur-
thermore, the dissent found that acceptance of the mortgage loan
application by the lender for processing established a business rela-
tionship. This business relationship gave rise to mutual duties: the
Jacques were expected to accurately furnish the information re-
quested, and the Bank was expected to evaluate the information
fairly and objectively."
55. Section 323 provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's
person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting
from this failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm,
or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the
undertaking.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1977). The Institute expressly offers no opinion as
to whether the making of an agreement, contract or gratuitous, without in any way beginning
performance, is sufficient to create a duty of care. This distinction between nonfeasance and
misfeasance is discussed infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
56. Jacques I, 62 Md. App. 54, 70, 488 A.2d at 28 n.5.
57. 425 So.2d 1050 (Ala. 1983).
58. The particular fact situation under which the duty of care arose in Caudle is rele-
vant. The bank in Caudle was negligent in wrongly informing the plaintiffs that their loan had
been approved. In fact, the bank did not notify the customers of its decision to deny the loan
until after their house was completed. This is extremely important given the relevance of reli-
ance in a determination of the duty of care for gratuitous undertakings. See infra note 83.
59. Jacques I, 62 Md. App. at 71, 488 A.2d at 218.
60. The court stated:
When the Jacques tendered, and the bank accepted, the mortgage loan ap-
plication, a business relationship was established. Acceptance of the application
for processing clearly indicated the bank's willingness to "deal" with the Jacques
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In short, the Court of Special Appeals split over the legal nature
of the loan application. It considered processing of the loan applica-
tion to be the procedure by which the lender determined whether it
would do business with the applicant. The court found an exercise of
the common law right to refuse to do business.6" The dissent consid-
ered it an extension in the lending context of the common law princi-
ple that, where one reasonably relies on a gratuitous performance by
another, the other has a duty to perform with reasonable care.62
C. Court of Appeals: Jacques 11
Maryland's highest court, the Court of Appeals, unanimously
reversed the Court of Special Appeals and held that a mortgage
lender has a tort duty to exercise reasonable care in processing a
loan application and in determining loan eligibility. In reaching this
conclusion, the court held that a mortgage loan application creates a
contract once it is accepted by the lender. Further, public policy re-
quires the lender to exercise reasonable care under the circum-
stances, because the lender implicitly promises to exercise such rea-
sonable care by virtue of the contract. Accordingly, a person injured
by a lender's careless processing of a loan application can elect to
sue either in contract or in tort to recover damages.
The court first reviewed the law of negligence recognizing, as
the Jacques I court had, that the crucial liability issue is whether a
duty of care should be imposed. The court stated that whether a
duty should arise in a given context must be determined by an exam-
ination of the nature of the harm likely to result and the relationship
between the parties.63 Since the nature of the harm was limited to
economic loss, a close relationship between the parties was
required.6'
and gave rise to mutual expectations. First National expected the Jacques to
supply information in a timely fashion. The Jacques expected that the informa-
tion supplied would be fairly, accurately, and objectively evaluated. Both had
ultimate expectations as well: First National to realize the profits normally asso-
ciated with loans of this kind and the Jacques, to obtain a loan at the interest
rate committed. These expectations, in turn, gave rise to mutual duties - to act
reasonably in their dealings with each other.
Id. at 72, 488 A.2d at 218.
61. Apparently, the court did not consider whether the bank's acceptance and processing
of the loan application created a contract.
62. Id. at 69, 488 A.2d at 218.
63. Jacques /1, 307 Md. 527, 534, 515 A.2d 756, 759 (1986).
64. The court stated that "[t]his intimate nexus is satisfied by contractual privity or its
equivalent." Id. at 534-35, 515 A.2d at 760. The court continued:
We discern from our review of the development of the law of tort duty that
an inverse correlation exists between the nature of the risk on the one hand and
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The court concluded that a tort duty of care arises in an eco-
nomic loss situation 65 only if there is a showing of an "intimate
nexus" between the parties, one "satisfied by contractual privity or
its equivalent." '66 First, the court evaluated the nature of the rela-
tionship between the loan applicant and the lender. Second, it held
that if the relationship is contractual in nature, the court must con-
sider the additional factors necessary to impose a duty of care.
In examining the nature of the plaintiff-lender relationship, the
court found that the Jacques and the bank entered into a binding
contractual agreement whereby the bank agreed to process the loan
application in return for a $144 application fee. The court found that
the lender made two express promises and one implied promise, each
supported by valid consideration. It expressly agreed to process the
loan application and to "lock in" the interest rate of 11 7/9% for a
period of ninety days. Implicit in the undertaking to process the loan
application was the agreement to do so with reasonable care.
The court noted that these promises were supported by two
kinds of valid consideration. First, the Jacques paid $144 for the ap-
praisal and credit report. The lender contended that this payment
did not constitute consideration, since the fee covered out-of-pocket
costs to the lender, with the money passed on to others. The court
disagreed, noting that consideration supporting a promise is valid
even if paid to a third person. Second, the court reasoned that the
lender obtained a business advantage and potential benefit sufficient
the relationship of the parties on the other . . . .Therefore, if the risk created
by negligent conduct is no greater than one of economic loss, generally no tort
duty will be found absent a showing of privity or its equivalent.
Id. at 537, 515 A.2d at 761. The support given for this statement is dubious. See generally
PROSSER & KEETON. TIlE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. In
all instances in which the issue of proximity is emphasized, the question concerns the appropri-
ateness of a tort claim by a remote party not in contractual privity with the defendant. See
infra note 115. Requiring a certain degree of proximity in such cases is not the same as hold-
ing that a tort claim is proper when there is contractual privity. Instead, it has been suggested
that courts should consider the following factors in deciding whether to allow recovery for
economic losses: the interests of the parties, the interests of society and a consideration of
economic efficiency and the future effects likely to result from an imposition of liability. Note,
A Framework for Determining Liability For Negligently Caused Economic Losses, 1986
B.Y.U. L. REV. 177, 183-95 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Framework].
65. It can be argued that this position is consistent with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS. Section 323 recognizes a duty of care in a gratuitous undertaking when negligence is a
proximate cause of physical harm but not when it is a proximate cause of economic loss. By
implication, recognition of a tort duty of care in an economic loss situation requires an under-
taking for consideration. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1977). But see infra notes
97-101 and accompanying text. Some jurisdictions do not consider the nature of the risk of
harm as a factor in determining the existence of a duty of care. These courts find no rational
basis to distinguish between a risk of personal injury and a risk of economic loss.
66. Jacques II, 307 Md. at 536, 515 A.2d at 760.
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to support its promises. Considering the practicalities of the home
loan market and particularly the expense of each application, the
court found that filing an application had the effect of taking the
customer out of the market at least temporarily. This created a busi-
ness advantage for the lender. 7
After finding a contractual relationship between the applicant
and the lender, the court asked whether it should recognize a con-
comitant duty in tort. In addressing the issue the court focused on
three factors: 1) the "rather extraordinary financing provisions,"
coupled with the dramatic increase in interest rates, which left the
Jacques "particularly vulnerable and dependent upon the Bank's ex-
ercise of due care;" 8 2) the lender's awareness of the Jacques' lim-
ited options and of its own obligations; and 3) the nature of the
banking industry,69 which is a business affecting the public interest.
7 0
The court expressly rejected the lender's contention that the largely
judgmental process of evaluating loan applications defied the imposi-
tion of a standard of care. The court also rejected the lender's theory
that since the Jacques might have sued for breach of contract, there
was no need to recognize a corresponding duty in tort.
7 1
67. Id. at 538, 515 A.2d at 761.
68. Id. at 540, 515 A.2d at 762.
69. The banking industry is regulated to protect the public interest. MD. FIN. INST.
CODE ANN. § 203(b) (1985 cum. supp.). The court stated that a duty of care generally arises
from contractual dealings with professionals. Id. at 541, 515 A.2d at 763. This distinction is
not made by all courts. See. e.g., Flintkote Co. v. Dravo Corp., 678 F.2d 942 (1Ilth Cir. 1982)
(court refused to impose a duty of care upon the defendant for economic loss regardless of his
status as a professional).
70. The court compared the banking industry with the insurance industry. Some courts
have imposed a duty on insurance companies to act promptly in reviewing submitted applica-
tions for insurance. See, e.g., United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Cannon, 349 F.2d 941 (8th Cir.
1965); Duffy v. Bankers' Life Ass'n, 160 Iowa 19, 139 N.W. 1087 (1913). However, as the
court admitted, the general rule is that no duty is created to process the application promptly.
307 Md. at 538-39, 515 A.2d at 762. See also Zayc v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 338
Pa. 426, 13 A.2d 34 (1940). See generally Funk, The Duty of an Insurer to Act Promptly on
Application, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 207 (1927); Prosser, Delay in Acting on an Application for
Insurance, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 39 (1935) [hereinafter Prosser, Delay]; Note, Insurance-The
Effect of the Insurer's Delay in Acting on an Application for Insurance, 36 TEMPLE L.Q. 84
(1962); Note, Insurance-Tort Liability-Delay in Acting Upon an Application, 16 OHIO ST.
L.J. III (1955); Comment, Insurance-Liability of Insurer for Failure to Settle-Tort or
Contract Basis for Action, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 783 (1959). For a more complete discussion of
an insurer's liability for delay in processing an application, see infra notes 106-07 and accom-
panying text.
71. The court noted that in instances of wrongful dishonor, the depositor is given an
option of choosing between a tort or contract action. 307 Md. at 538, 515 A.2d at 761, citing
Magness v. Trust Co., 176 Md. 528, 6 A.2d 241 (1939). The court, however, failed to recog-
nize the confusion that arose in court treatment from the question of the nature of the action
for wrongful dishonor. U.C.C. § 4-402 refuses to specify a theory of recovery. See U.C.C. § 4-
402, official comment 2 (1978). See generally Dow, Damages and Proof in Cases of Wrongful
Dishonor: The Unsettled Issues Under UCC Section 4-402, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 237 (1985).
Although Jacques II did not clearly enunciate this position, wrongful dishonor is an example
LENDER LIABILITY
IV. Analysis
One major distinction between the Jacques I and Jacques H
holdings lies in the threshold determination of whether acceptance of
the Jacques' loan application created a contractual relationship %'ith
the lender. The focus of the issue shifted drastically from Jacques I
to Jacques I. The Court of Special Appeals in Jacques I did not
consider whether the acceptance and processing of a loan application
created a contract.72 The Court of Appeals in Jacques II would not
even consider the issue of a tort duty of care in an economic loss
situation without first determining that there was a contract or its
equivalent.73 Thus, the question of the existence of a contractual re-
lationship must be addressed.
A. Loan Applications As Contracts
The decision by the court in Jacques II is sound with respect to
the contract issue. A lender is free to accept or reject a loan applica-
tion.74 Once a lender accepts a loan application and payment for ap-
praisal and credit check costs, however, it has made a contract. Con-
trary to the position that processing the loan application and
determining the applicant's loan eligibility is merely the procedure
by which the lender determines whether it will do business with the
applicant, the lender's acceptance of the loan application for process-
ing includes express and implied promises supported by consideration
from the applicant. In exchange for payment of the bank's costs in
having the property appraised and the applicant's creditworthiness
checked and for the business advantage of the loan potential, the
lender promises: 1) to fairly and accurately determine the applicant's
loan eligibility; and 2) if eligible, to make the loan at the rate and
term promised, and in the eligible amount. 5 In the instant case, an
agreement was reached in which the lender agreed to process the
loan application in return for payment of a fee. Therefore, it is clear
of an action for which a defendant might incur liability in tort or in contract. See. e.g.,
Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United Cal. Bank, 50 Cal. App. 3d 949, 123 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1975);
Bank of Louisville Royal v. Sims, 435 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
72. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
74. The lender is obviously subject to statutory restrictions in this decision-making
process.
75. The term "eligible" includes discretionary judgments by the lender as to whether the
applicant should be granted a loan. Such eligibility should be determined by some reasonable
process, rather than in an arbitrary fashion. It should be remembered, however, that the lender
in Jacques agreed to process the loan application; it did not agree to lend money. It was, at
this point, free to refuse to extend a loan. This is relevant to the issue of damages as well as to
the issue of proximate cause.
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that the Jacques could have properly asserted a claim for breach of
contract.76
B. Loan Applications As Creating a Concomitant Duty of Care in
Tort
The Court of Appeals in Jacques H found that the lender and
the plaintiff entered into a contractual agreement whereby the Bank
promised to process the Jacques' loan application in return for a
$144 loan application fee.7 That agreement contained an implicit
promise to process the application using reasonable care. Although
the case could have been initiated under breach of contract theories,
it was, instead, pursued as a negligence action. Therefore, the appro-
priateness of negligence relief in a breach of contract context must
be examined.
76. The Jacques might have faced difficulty recovering substantial damages under a
breach of contract theory. If a lender mistakenly determines an applicant's loan eligibility, the
applicant can sue for breach of contract damages in one of two situations: I) when the appli-
cant is forced to obtain more costly financing to purchase the house; and 2) when the applicant
cannot complete the purchase transaction because of lack of financing.
In the first situation, the plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages requires him to seek the
least costly alternative financing in a timely and reasonable way. When interest rates are esca-
lating rapidly over a short period of time, the difference in cumulative financing costs for a
fixed-rate thirty-year mortgage could be substantial. One measure of damages is the difference
between the thirty-year cost of alternative financing and the thirty-year cost that would have
been incurred based on an accurate determination of loan eligibility. A major problem with
this standard is determining the applicable period of time for calculation. It might not be
reasonable to assume that the plaintiff/purchaser with a thirty-year mortgage at a higher rate
would actually remain in the home for the length of the thirty-year mortgage. Nor would it be
reasonable to require an annual payment of the "running difference" until the property is sold.
A reasonable measure of damages might require the negligent lender to pay off the mort-
gage loan owed to the second lender. A mortgage loan would then be prepared with the first
lender for the amount and at the rate of the initial loan eligibility determination, had it been
accurate. It would be even more difficult to establish a measure of damages for the situation in
which a purchase transaction cannot be completed because of lack of financing and when
another party has purchased the home in the interim.
Although it is not clear what constituted the $92,000 damages sought in the Jacques case,
it is presumed that at least some portion represented consequential damages. Consequential
damages are recoverable in breach of contract cases only when they are reasonably foreseeable
at the time of contract formation. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
See infra notes 134-140 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue as it relates to a
comparison between tort and contract actions. The likelihood of consequential damages being
sought is greater in the commercial than the consumer applicant situation. See infra notes
126-30, proposing different treatment for consumer and commercial situations.
77. The lender argued that no consideration supported any contractual agreement, since
the $144 fee was "passed-on" to others. (Basically, the fee covered expenses of processing such
as an appraisal and credit search.) The court rejected this argument. The fact that a payment
is passed on to or paid directly to a third party does not render the agreement unsupported by
consideration. In addition, the application process created a business advantage benefiting the
Bank. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. Furthermore, even if the promise to process
was not supported by consideration, a gratuitous promise might give rise to a duty of care. See
infra note 83 and accompanying text.
LENDER LIABILITY
To successfully maintain a negligence action, one must establish
four elements: 1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care; 2)
the defendant breached this duty of care; 3) damages occurred; and
4) these damages were proximately caused by the defendant's
breach. 8 In Jacques, the major obstacle to recovery was the estab-
lishment of a duty owed to the Jacques. 9 The question that arises is
the extent to which creation of a contract establishes a duty owed
from lender to borrower. 80 In other words, under what circumstances
can breach of the contract constitute breach of a duty of care8"
equalling negligence? The interrelationship between tort82 and con-
tract actions must be explored.8"
78. See generally Cramer v. Housing Opportunities Comm'n, 304 Md. 705, 501 A.2d 35
(1985).
79. Recall that the Jacques were able to demonstrate deviation from the applicable stan-
dard in several ways. See supra note 42.
80. It is not unusual for the same set of facts to give rise to claims which are both
contractual and tortious in nature. For example, when a plaintiff-buyer is injured by a defec-
tive and negligently manufactured product, he can choose to sue under the tort of negligence,
breach of contract (warranty) or strict liability. See, e.g., Flintkote Co. v. Dravo Corp., 678
F.2d 942 (11 th Cir. 1982). This is, however, limited by the nature of the harm suffered by the
plaintiff. Under the majority rule, the plaintiff is limited to the contract action where the loss
suffered is purely economic. See, e.g., East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval,
Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2295 (1986). See infra notes 95-113 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the relevance of the nature of loss to the availability of tort relief.
81. Plaintiff established that the defendant failed to exercise due care in processing the
loan application in several ways. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
82. Plaintiff's suit was brought upon several grounds, all tortious in nature. See supra
notes 38-40 and accompanying text. The Jacques did not initiate a claim for breach of con-
tract. The plaintiffs alleged damages in the amount of $92,000. Winchurch, supra note 40, at
1. It is unclear exactly what losses this figure includes. Therefore, it is impossible to determine
whether these damages would be compensable under a breach of contract theory. See gener-
ally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 64, at 664-65, for a discussion of the differences in dam-
ages recoverable under each theory.
83. Absent an agreement between the parties, the lender does not owe a duty to process
an application submitted by the Jacques. It is, in fact, well-settled that one does not have a
duty to undertake affirmative action on behalf of strangers. This statement is supported by the
plethora of cases dealing with the lack of a duty to aid one in peril. See, e.g., Munson v. Otis,
396 A.2d 994 (D.C. 1979) (home improvement operator owed no duty to general public);
Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 510 A.2d 1078 (1986) (police owed no duty
to protect injured plaintiff from drunken driver); Furr v. Spring Grove State Hospital, 53 Md.
App. 474, 454 A.2d 414 (1983) (psychiatrist owed no duty to protect murder victim from
criminal acts of patient); H.R. Moch Co., Inc. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159
N.E. 896 (1928) (waterworks company not liable for failure to supply water to plaintiff whose
house burned). See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 64, at 375-77. This principle is
true except in unusual circumstances such as those detailed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 314A (1977) (common carrier, innkeeper, and possessor of land who holds it open to
the public). Moreover, since a lender is free to choose with whom it desires to do business, it is
under no obligation to enter into a contractual relationship with an applicant.
It can be argued, however, that although the lender in Jacques was under no obligation, a
duty arose when the lender gratuitously entered into a relationship with the plaintiffs. It was
upon this basis that the dissent in Jacques I would have predicated liability. See supra notes
54-56 and accompanying text. When one undertakes performance of a task, even one which he
has no duty to undertake, a limited duty arises. This duty, in general, arises where the plaintiff
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Tort obligations are imposed by law; 4 contractual obligations
are imposed by agreement between the parties. An independent tort
action will be permitted only when the breach is a breach of duty
imposed by law and not merely a breach of duty imposed by con-
tract. 5 In determining whether, in any given situation, the duty is
imposed by law or merely by contract, courts have traditionally used
one of two approaches. 86
relies upon the gratuitous promise of the defendant and such reliance causes harm. See gener-
ally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 64, at 378-382. It can be argued that the Jacques relied
on the lender's promise to process the loan application, presumably with the requisite degree of
care, by failing to seek alternative financing. As a result, they were injured by the increase in
interest rates that occurred during the period that the defendant was processing the applica-
tion. The defendant, by voluntarily accepting the loan application, worsened the plaintiffs con-
dition, and harm resulted.
This reasoning, although appealing at first glance, merits closer attention. The liability
under this doctrine is generally extended to personal or property injury cases rather than to
cases of economic loss. Restatement § 323, by its express terms, applies to instances where the
plaintiff suffers "physical harm." See supra note 55. The dissent in Jacques I found this prin-
ciple applicable by analogy. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. See also infra
notes 97-113 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difference in imposition of liability
based upon a categorization of the type of injury (e.g., personal injury, property damage or
economic loss).
It must also be remembered that even if the loans had been processed properly, the lender
might have denied the loan application upon more subjective criteria. The Jacques must have
been aware of the potential for denial; therefore, they could not have justifiably relied upon the
lender's action in accepting the loan application without any promise of loan extension. This
argument is also relevant to the question of proximate cause. See, e.g., Kemp v. Armstrong, 40
Md. App. 542, 392 A.2d 1161 (1978), where the court refused to impose tort liability for
negligent performance of a voluntarily assumed duty. The court equated lack of reliance upon
the defendant's promise to lack of proximate cause. This issue was not addressed by the Jac-
ques 11 court. See Elkton Auto Sales Corp. v. Maryland, 53 F.2d 8 (4th Cir. 1931) for a
statement of the meaning of proximate cause in Maryland.
84. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 64, at 655.
85. Id. at 656. United States v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 25 F.2d 157 (D. Md.
1928); John Deere Co. v. Short, 378 S.W.2d 496 (Mo. 1964); Mulvey v. Staab, 4 N.M. (Gild.,
E.W.S. ed.) 172, 12 P. 699 (1887); Curtis, Damage Measurements for Bad Faith Breach of
Contract: An Economic Analysis, 39 STAN. L. REV. 161, 163-64 (1986); Morgan, The Negli-
gent Contract-Breaker, 58 CAN. B. REV. 299, 302 (1980); Note, Should Contract or Tort
Provide the Cause of Action When a Plaintiff Seeks Recovery Only for Damage to the Defec-
tive Product Itself?, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 489, 497 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Contract or Tort].
A duty in tort is said to arise where there would be a duty to use reasonable care if the same
act were done gratuitously without a contract. Morgan, supra at 302, 307.
86. Courts generally adopt one of the two approaches without any consideration of the
other; thus, courts which discuss misfeasance and nonfeasance fail to consider the type of loss
suffered without explanation. No discernible differences can be found between the cases falling
into the different categories. While products liability cases comprise a large part of the cases
that consider the type of loss suffered, see, e.g., East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica
Delaval, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2295 (1986); Flintkote Co. v. Dravo Corp., supra note 69, they are
not the only cases in this category. See, e.g., McClain v. Harveston, 152 Ga. App. 422, 263
S.E.2d 288 (1979) (contractor liability); Foxcroft Townhome Owners Ass'n v. Hoffman Ros-
ner Corp., 105 III. App. 3d 951, 435 N.E.2d 210, 215 (1982) (builder liability); Redarowicz v.
Ohlendorf, 95 III. App. 3d 444, 420 N.E.2d 209 (1981) (builder liability). But see Sabella v.
Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963) (court refused to limit tort
relief to cases of personal injury or property damage). The Sabella court found the cases in the
products liability area inapplicable and held that the "liability of a contractor should be deter-
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C. Misfeasance87 v. Nonfeasance"8
Courts that adopt the misfeasance versus nonfeasance approach
hold that one can recover in tort, as well as in contract, for misfea-
sance, but not for nonfeasance. 89 Under this theory, failure to begin
performance of an agreement to lend money is actionable in contract
but not in tort. 90 On the other hand, once the defendant has taken
some action to begin performance, 91 the likelihood of imposing tort
liability increases. 92 Contractors,9" abstractors,"4  architects 8  and
others 6 have been found liable in negligence for defective perform-
ance of the contractual promise. While it is not always easy to deter-
mine whether sufficient action has been taken on the part of the de-
fendant to constitute misfeasance, rather than nonfeasance, it
appears that, in the case at hand, the bank had begun performance.
mined by consideration and weighing of the various factors bearing upon liability ..., rather
than by resort to special rules or distinctions." Id. at 29, 377 P.2d at 894, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
The choice between approaches is also not made upon a jurisdictional basis. Within jurisdic-
tions, courts will consider misfeasance versus nonfeasance in some cases, and the type of loss in
other cases.
87. Misfeasance is "negligent affirmative conduct in the performance" of the contractual
promise. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 64, at 656.
88. Nonfeasance is failing to do what one has promised to do. Id. at 657.
89. Id. at 656-662. This distinction can be traced to the development of contract and
tort law. Id. at 658-60. See also MacGrath, The Recovery of Pure Economic Loss in Negli-
gence - An Emerging Dichotomy, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 350, 360-71 (1985). For cases
in which the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance was determinative, see, e.g., E
& M Construction Co. v. Bob, 115 Ga. App. 127, 153 S.E.2d 641 (1967); Mauldin v. ShelTer,
113 Ga. App. 874, 150 S.E.2d 150 (1966); Hart v. Ludwig, 347 Mich. 559, 79 N.W.2d 895
(1956); Chase v. Clinton County, 241 Mich. 478, 217 N.W. 565 (1928).
90. See, e.g., John Deere Co. v. Short, 378 S.W.2d 496 (Mo. 1964); Farabee-Treadwell
Co. v. Union & Planters Bank & Trust Co., 135 Tenn. 208, 186 S.W. 92 (1916). These cases
were both cited in Jacques I but were not discussed in Jacques II.
91. A great deal of confusion exists with respect to the degree of action required before
nonfeasance becomes misfeasance. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 64, at 661-
62. The test has been stated as "whether the defendant's performance, as distinct from his
promise or his preparation, has gone so far that it has begun to affect the interests of the
plaintiff beyond the expected benefits of the contract itself, and is to be regarded ...as a
positive act assuming the obligation." Id. at 662.
92. Id. at 660.
93. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 25 F. 157 (D. Md. 1928);
Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm Price, Inc., 483 A.2d 1192 (D.C. 1984); E & M Construction Co. v.
Bob, 115 Ga. App. 127, 153 S.E.2d 641 (1967).
94. See. e.g., Dorr v. Massachusetts Title Ins. Co., 238 Mass. 490, 131 N.E. 191 (1921).
95. Friendship Heights Associates v. Vlastimil Koubek, 573 F. Supp. 100 (D. Md. 1983)
(architect not liable for negligence because of lack of proximate cause); Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm
Price, Inc., 483 A.2d 1192 9D.C. App. 1984); Cutlip v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 22 Md. App. 673,
325 A.2d 432 (1974). For a discussion of architects' tort liability, see generally Archer, Archi-
tects' Liability to Third Party Contractors for Economic Loss Resulting from Faulty Plans
and Specifications, 27 ARiz. L. REV. 139 (1985); Jackson, The Role of Contract in Architec-
tural and Engineering Malpractice, 51 INS. COUNSEL J. 517 (1984).
96. See. e.g., Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954) (test hole driller);
Mauldin v. ShelTer, I13 Ga. App. 874, 150 S.E.2d 150 (1966) (engineer); Glanzer v. Shepard,
233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) (public bean weigher).
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The application was accepted and processed. The plaintiffs alleged
that the application was processed improperly. Thus, this action
could have been correctly classified as a complaint for misfeasance,
for which tort liability might be available.
D. Type of Loss Suffered
Under this approach, a distinction is made with respect to the
type of injury suffered by the plaintiff: personal injury, property
damage, or economic loss. 97 Courts adopting this approach98 hold
that one can recover in tort, as well as in contract, for personal or
property damage; liability is, however, limited to contract liability in
instances of purely economic loss."9 For example, a builder or con-
tractor is generally not liable in tort for economic loss suffered due
to delays or defects in construction. 00 He would, however, be liable
for personal or property damage stemming from negligent perform-
ance of the contract.' °0
One of the few instances0 2 in which tort recovery has been per-
mitted for economic loss is where the defendant accepted an applica-
tion for insurance, delayed processing the application and then de-
nied the insurance.' The legal issue in the insurance cases revolves
around the question of whether the defendant owes the plaintiff a
97. Economic loss is essentially commercial in nature and can be broken down into two
types, direct and indirect. Direct economic loss is damage to the thing contracted for (e.g., the
product sold or the building built). Indirect economic loss is consequential damage suffered
because of the breach. Wildermuth, Recovery of Economic Loss in Products Liability Actions,
30 TRIAL L. GUIDE 229 (1986); Note, Torts: Recovery of Damages for Economic Loss
Through the Use of Strict Liability in Tort, 38 OKLA. L. REv. 347 (1985) [hereinafter Note,
Recovery].
98. This liability might be subject to the limitations discussed above with respect to
misfeasance and nonfeasance.
99. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 64, at 657. See also Flintkote Co. v.
Dravo Corp., 678 F.2d 942 (11 th Cir. 1982); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho
326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978); Album Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 87 III. App. 3d 338,
408 N.E.2d 1041 (1980).
100. See, e.g., Flintkote Co. v. Dravo Corp., 678 F.2d 942 (11 th Cir. 1982); McClain v.
Harveston, 152 Ga. App. 422, 263 S.E.2d 228 (1979); Foxcroft Townhome Owners Ass'n v.
Hoffman Rosner Corp., 105 III. App. 3d 951, 61 III. Dec. 721, 435 N.E.2d 210 (1982);
Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 95 II. App. 3d 444, 50 III. Dec. 892, 420 N.E.2d 209 (1981); C.H.
Leavell & Co. v. Vilbig Bros., Inc., 335 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. 1960).
101. Similarly, architects and engineers have been found liable in tort for breach of
contractual obligations when the result was property damage or personal injury. See supra
notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
102. Tort recovery has been allowed in a limited number of cases for breach of the
contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See supra note 26.
103. See, e.g., United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Cannon, 349 F.2d 941 (8th Cir. 1965);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 210 F. Supp. 735 (W.D.S.C. 1962); Valdez v. Taylor Automo-
bile Co., 129 Cal. App. 2d 810, 278 P.2d 91 (1955); Duffy v. Bankers' Life Ass'n, 160 Iowa
19, 139 N.W. 1087 (1913).
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duty to respond to the application in a reasonably timely manner.10 4
Tort liability has been predicated upon the defendant's failure to re-
spond in a more timely manner. 105 Tort liability with respect to de-
lay in acting upon insurance applications is, however, the exception
rather than the rule. The majority of cases 06 hold that no duty of
care arises from merely accepting the application for insurance."0 7
The distinction between economic and other loss is derived from
the difference between the basic substance of a tort action and a
contract action - the nature of the remedy sought. For example, in
a products liability claim when a plaintiff suffers purely economic
loss, majority rule denies recovery in either negligence or strict lia-
bility, limiting recovery to the contract breach of warranty action. 08
The Supreme Court, in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamer-
ica Delaval, Inc., 09 based this denial upon the nature of the injury
in an economic loss case." 0 The Court reasoned that economic loss is
104. The question in Jacques did not involve timely response to the application but
rather the reasonableness of the response.
105. In the majority of cases finding liability, the duty of care was created by the princi-
ple that, when one, even gratuitously, undertakes an obligation upon which another might
justifiably rely, a duty to reasonably perform that undertaking is found. See supra notes 54-56
(doctrine applied by the court in Jacques 1). See also supra note 83.
106. See, e.g., Patten v. Continental Casualty Co., 162 Ohio St. 18, 120 N.E.2d 441
(1954); Zayc v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 338 Pa. 426, 13 A.2d 34 (1940); Funk,
supra note 70; Prosser, Delay, supra note 70. See also supra note 70. See also infra note 123
and accompanying text.
107. This is true even when the application for insurance is included with a premium
payment. If the application is rejected, the insurance company is merely required to return the
premium.
108. The leading case for the majority is Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403
P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965). See Wildermuth, supra note 97 at 229 n.2, for the states
adopting the majority approach. See also Note, Recovery, supra note 97 at 352 n.38. For a
case following the majority approach, see, e.g., S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587
F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978). The leading case setting forth the minority rule allowing recovery
for economic loss is Santor v. A and M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
See Wildermuth, supra note 97 at 234 n.3, for the states adopting the minority approach. See
also Note, Recovery, supra note 97, at 350 n.25. For a case following the minority approach,
see, e.g., State ex rel Western Seed Prod. Corp. v. Campbell, 250 Or. 262, 442 P.2d 215
(1968).
The availability of tort relief for economic loss in products liability cases has been the
subject of numerous articles. See. e.g., Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Eco-
nomic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 61, 70-75
(1982); Wildermuth, supra note 97; Note, Framework, supra note 64; Note, Recovery, supra
note 97; Note, Contract or Tort, supra note 85.
109. 106 S. Ct. 2295 (1986). This case reached the Supreme Court as a products liabil-
ity action in admiralty.
110. This rationale would be equally applicable to non-products liability actions; how-
ever, the rationale might not be applicable to certain consumer transactions. The Court exam-
ines the differences between personal injury or property loss and economic loss, concluding that
economic loss is less "overwhelming." It relies upon the fact that the commercial plaintiff is
likely to be insured against economic losses. Id. at 2302. This insurance would not be feasible,
even if available, to the consumer plaintiff. Similarly, the Court is willing to limit liability to
the terms of the contract in a commercial setting where there is no unequal bargaining power
92 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW WINTER 1988
the "essence of a warranty [contract] action, through which a con-
tracting party can seek to recoup the benefit of its bargain." ' In
fact, an action in which a plaintiff sues to recover loss of the benefit
of its bargain 1 2  is "traditionally the core concern of contract
law."
13
E. Jacques IH Rationale
Although the result reached by the Jacques If court was proper
under the facts presented, the court's opinion fails, in several re-
spects, to properly address the issues presented. First, it fails to com-
pletely recognize the common law distinctions relevant to imposition
of a duty of care. Second, it fails to adequately distinguish prior case
law barring negligence liability against lenders. Furthermore, the
court fails to appreciate the implication of its holding."
A tort duty of care exists when negligent conduct is the proxi-
mate cause of physical harm to reasonably foreseeable plaintiffs, re-
gardless of the proximity of the relationship between plaintiff and
defendant. The Jacques I court held, however, that a duty of care
will not be recognized in purely economic loss situations unless there
is a "special nexus" amounting to contractual privity 1 5 or its
that might affect the parties' own risk allocation. Id. at 2303. Again, this might not be the case
in some consumer contracts.
Ill. Id. at 2300.
112. This would include damage to the product itself, as well as consequential damages
such as lost profits.
113. East River, 106 S. Ct. at 2302. See infra notes 133-40 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the differences between tort and contract remedies.
114. Some scholars assert that contract actions have been, or will be, supplanted by tort
actions. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (paperback ed. 1974). See also Metzger
& Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and the Evolution of Contract Law, 18 AM. Bus. LJ. 139
(1980), for a discussion of the history and the interrelationship of tort and contract actions as
they relate to the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
115. The court found two cases persuasive in determining that the nature of the rela-
tionship in instances of economic loss is crucial. In Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135
N.E. 275 (1922), the court found a public bean weigher liable to a buyer of beans for negli-
gent weighing. The weigher was hired by the seller and was therefore in contractual privity
only with the seller. Similarly, in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441
(1931), the court considered imposition of liability upon an accountant where his negligence in
preparing a balance sheet was responsible for losses to a third party who made loans to the
corporation in reliance upon the financial statements. While the court is correct in its conclu-
sion that the nature of the relationship is important in determining whether a duty of care
arises in negligence cases, the cases cited do not support the more expansive Jacques 11 hold-
ing. The court stated that "significant in both of these cases is the fact that the court had no
difficulty in finding that the actors under each contract owed a tort duty of due care to the
parties with whom they had contractual privity or its legal equivalent. 307 Md. at 536, 515
A.2d at 760-761 (1986). It must be remembered that that question was addressed in neither
Glanzer nor Ultramares. The courts in both cases were examining only the question of liability
to third parties with whom the defendants were not in contractual privity. In each case, it was
doubtful whether the third party would be able to recover for breach of contract as a mere
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equivalent between the plaintiff and defendant.116 The Jacques H
court reached this conclusion by relying on cases in which no con-
tractual privity existed."' Such cases stand for the proposition that
lack of contractual privity should not bar tort recovery where the
relationship is sufficiently close. They cannot be read for the proposi-
tion that a plaintiff injured by a negligent breach of contract can
elect a cause of action in tort ' 8 or contract even for pure economic
loss. The court's conclusion is not adequately supported by the cases
cited. "'
Under Jacques II, finding a special nexus is a prerequisite to
creating a duty of care in economic loss cases. It is not, however,
sufficient. The court found that certain policy considerations estab-
lish the duty in combination with the closeness of the relationship.
The court considered a number of circumstances relevant to its rec-
ognition of a concomitant tort duty of care. The court first cited the
rather extraordinary financing provisions that left the Jacques vul-
nerable and dependent upon the lender's exercise of due care. 120 The
Jacques were indeed vulnerable, but they were vulnerable by their
own choice, and they were not unsophisticated people.' 2' The lender,
however, was free to accept or to reject the loan application, and
incidental third party beneficiary. See, e.g., Marlboro Shirt Co. v. American Dist. Tel. Co.,
196 Md. 565, 77 A.2d 776 (1951) (plaintiffs claim as a third party beneficiary was barred
against a contractor due to lack of privity). Tort recovery might have been the only option. For
a discussion of the role of both the Glanzer and Ultramares cases in the development of the
trend toward relaxation of privity requirements, see G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA - AN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 131-35 (1980). In Jacques, recovery for breach of contract was
clearly an option since the Jacques 1 court found a contract. See supra note 67 and accompa-
nying text. Moreover, the tort liability in Glanzer and Ultramares would be akin to negligent
misrepresentation rather than negligent performance, which is generally an independent tort.
See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 64, at Chapter 15.
116. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. Apparently, the direct relationship cre-
ated by reasonable reliance on the gratuitous undertaking of another for one's benefit is not
enough of a "special nexus" to allow raising the question of a tort duty of care.
117. In such cases where there has been a relaxation of the privity requirement, courts
appear to be willing to allow third parties to recover for economic losses suffered under tort
theories. See, e.g., Dorr v. Massachusetts Title Ins. Co., 238 Mass. 490, 131 N.E. 191 (1921);
Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 315 N.E. 275 (1922); State ex rel Western Seed Prod.
Corp. v. Campbell, 250 Or. 262, 442 P.2d 215 (1968); Archer, supra note 95; Jones, Eco-
nomic Loss-Expanding the Duty of Care, 132 NEW L.J. 1091 (1982); MacGrath, supra note
89; Probert, Negligence and Economic Damage: The California-Florida Nexus, 33 U..FLA. L.
REV. 485 (1981).
118. Where the gist of the action is contract, a contract action should lie. Dawson Cot-
ton Oil Co. v. Kenan, McKay & Speir, 21 Ga. App. 688, 94 S.E. 1037 (1918).
119. Prosser and Keeton state that tort recovery is not appropriate under such circum-
stances. "Such a claim should not be translatable into a tort action in order to escape some
roadblock to recovery on a contract theory." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 64, at 659.
120. Jacques 11, 307 Md. at 540, 515 A.2d at 762.
121. Mr. Jacques was, in fact, a government attorney.
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accepted it with knowledge of the special financing provisions in the
purchasing contract. Agreeing to act with knowledge of the other
party's need and reliance required careful consideration of the
application.
The second crucial factor cited by the Jacques II court was the
recognition of the banking industry as a business affected with a
public interest and subject to legislative requirements expressive of
public policy. 12 12 Any loan application accepted by a lending institu-
tion would, therefore, create not only a contract but also a concomi-
tant tort duty of care. In other words, the policy consideration that
justified creating a tort duty of care in this case was merely the fact
that the defendant was a bank.
The question that must be addressed is to what extent should
banks be treated differently than other businesses? States charter
and regulate lending institutions in a much different way than other
businesses. Public policy requires a high standard of integrity from
those in control and close scrutiny of lending operations. Does this
public policy concern, however, justify the imposition of a duty to
use reasonable care in the course of the lending operations?
The insurance industry is also an industry affected with public
policy. 123 In the majority of cases, courts have refused to find insur-
ance companies liable for negligence for delay in processing insur-
ance applications. 2 4 There are, however, crucial differences. First,
122. The court held:
Unlike most other corporations, in Maryland a state bank may not be
chartered until there has been an investigation by a state official and a determi-
nation that "[tihe character, responsibility, and general fitness of the incorpora-
tors and directors named in the articles command confidence and warrant belief
that the business of the proposed commercial bank will be conducted honestly
and efficiently ...and [that] [aillowing the proposed commercial bank to en-
gage in business ...[wlill promote public convenience and advantage .... "
...The recognition of a tort duty of reasonable care under the circumstances
presented by this case is thus consistent with the policy of this State as expressed
by the Legislature, and reasonable in light of the nature of the banking industry
and its relation to public welfare.
Id. at 542-43, 515 A.2d at 764 (citations omitted).
123. In arguing against imposition of tort liability for delay in application for insurance,
Prosser recognizes the similarities. Two arguments have been advanced for imposing liability.
Some scholars assert that a duty of care arises based upon the state franchise of the insurance
company. Prosser states that nothing in the state franchise should impose liability. He recog-
nizes that banks also operate under state franchise. Thus, the franchise "should impose no
more duty to act without delay upon applications than would be required of a bank receiving a
request for a loan." Prosser, Delay. supra note 70, at 52. Another group asserts that insurance
is a business so affected with public interest that a duty to act in a timely fashion arises.
Prosser rejects this assertion stating that "banking is affected with a public interest, but it
never has been suggested that a bank may be required to act promptly on a requested loan
.Id. at 52-53.
124. See supra notes 106-107 and accompany text. See also supra note 70.
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the lender in Jacques was found liable for negligence in the process
of evaluating the application, not for mere delay in beginning the
process. In fact, courts have shown a willingness to impose tort lia-
bility upon insurance companies for bad faith breach of contract.
125
Second, lending institutions exist to facilitate the public's economic
well-being and, accordingly, should be held responsible for any eco-
nomic loss due to their negligence. 126 This stems from the nature of
the loan source and not the kind of loan.
Imposition of a concomitant tort duty would, however, be inap-
propriate in all cases where the breach of contract resulted in purely
economic loss. Where the relationship between the parties is com-
mercial in nature, recovery for economic loss should be limited to
contract. Although the distinction between commercial and con-
sumer contracts has traditionally not been made, the Supreme Court
emphasized the commercial nature of the contract in the East River
case.127 In the commercial setting, losses suffered because of negli-
gent breach of contract, including consequential damages,128 are in-
surable.' 29 Moreover, where the parties are customarily of compara-
tively equal bargaining power, contract law provides sufficient
protection. 3 0 This is not necessarily true in a consumer situation.
First, consumers typically cannot insure themselves against losses
that might result from negligence similar to that which occurred in
Jacques. Second, the parties do not have equal bargaining power. A
consumer applicant is given few rights of negotiation with the lender.
For this reason, the consumer's recourse should not be limited to the
agreement between the parties.
Moreover, the prior case law denying a duty of care is generally
distinguishable from the case at hand. In cases in which a lender was
sued for negligently processing a loan application, most courts found
no duty of care. 1' In the foremost case attaching negligence liability
to the lender, the lender was an active participant in the project to
125. See supra note 26.
126. See Comment, Is the Account Good for this Check? Bank Liability for Negligent
Responses to Credit Inquiries, 1983 ANN. REV. OF BANKING LAW 165 (1983) (the special role
banks play in the economic system justifies imposition of a high standard of care).
127. East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 106 S. Ct. 2295 (1986). See
supra notes 109-113 and accompanying text for a discussion of the East River case with re-
spect to recovery for economic loss.
128. It seems reasonable that consequential damages such as lost profits are more likely
to arise in a commercial rather than a consumer setting.
129. East River, 106 S. Ct. at 2302.
130. Id. at 2303.
131. See supra notes 14-25 and accompanying text.
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be financed.132 Arguably, the court imposed liability upon the lender
more for his part in the sale of the defective housing units than for
his negligence in processing the loan application. All prior cases,
however, involved allegations of negligent lending rather than negli-
gent processing per se. In each of the cases rejecting liability, the
defendant bank was sued for lending money to the plaintiff for what
turned out to be a losing business proposition. All cases rejecting
liability arose in the commercial setting.
The Jacques II holding illustrates the expansion of the tort
cause of action. 133 Conversion of a contract claim into a tort claim is
desirable to a plaintiff for several reasons, 34 particularly because it
often allows the recovery of significantly increased damages. The
damages recoverable in tort are far different than those recoverable
in contract. Tort damages are designed to compensate for the injury
proximately caused by the defendant's conduct."s5 Alternatively,
contract damages are designed to put the plaintiff in the position he
would have been in had the contract been performed as promised.'
This includes compensation for the full benefit of the bargain, in-
cluding lost profits.'3" Punitive damages are, of course, available in
tort actions but not in contract actions. Moreover, there are impor-
tant limitations upon recovery of contract damages. The contract it-
self might provide limitations. By and large, such provisions are not
enforceable to exculpate the defendant from tort liability, but oper-
ate effectively with respect to contract liability. 138 In addition, the
rule of Hadley v. Baxendale3 " limits the recovery of consequential
damages to those damages which were reasonably within the con-
templation of the parties at the time of contract formation. Under a
tort claim, consequential damages are recoverable as long as they
are proximately caused by the negligence. Thus, one might fashion
132. Connor v. Great Western Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 881, 447 P.2d 609, 73
Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969). See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
133. It is this shift that Gilmore explores in his book, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT. G.
GILMORE, supra note 114.
134. See Perlman, supra note 108, at 79-82, and PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 64, at
664-667, for a discussion of the differences between tort and contract actions. See, e.g., Kozan
v. Comstock, 270 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1959) (effect of the statute of limitations upon accrual);
United Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 223 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1955) (application of the
collateral source rule).
135. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 64, at 665.
136. East River, 106 S. Ct. at 2303 (1986); Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 A.
641 (1929).
137. East River,. 106 S. Ct. at 2303; Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Con-
tract Damages: 1, 46 YALE LJ. 52, 60-63 (1936).
138. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 64, at 665.
139. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
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what would otherwise be a contract claim into a tort claim to recover
certain consequential damages. 4"
V. Managerial Implications
The Jacques H holding is significant and could have far-reach-
ing implications as an expansion of the newly-developing area of
lender liability. The Jacques decision subjects mortgage lenders to
liability for negligent processing of loan applications. Under the
court's rationale, lenders face the potential of increased liability
under negligence theory,' 4 with the duty to exercise reasonable care
arising before creation of the debtor-creditor relationship. This po-
tential liability is created even before any loan commitment is is-
sued."" The practical implications for lenders are obvious. Lending
institutions may reasonably expect lawsuits from applicants who
have suffered economic loss because of denial of a loan or a loan of
less than the amount requested. The injured applicants may sue ei-
ther in contract or in tort. Lenders may also reasonably expect a
corresponding increase in their tort liability premiums to cover the
possibility of such lawsuits.
The potential for lender liability is further increased by the fact
that the Jacques rationale, although dealing with a residential mort-
gage loan application, is equally applicable to other loan applica-
tions. The rationale applies equally to loan applications for the con-
sumer purchase of a boat, a car, a major appliance, or to a personal
loan application. 4 A lawsuit might result from a mistaken or
wrongful denial of any loan application where the applicant suffers
economic loss as a result. First, all loan applications, once accepted
for processing by the lender, should be considered contracts. When a
lender holds itself out to the public as a source of loans based on
predetermined eligibility standards, the lender implicitly promises to
make loans to qualified applicants in the amount, at the rate, and for
the term advertised, regardless of whether the loan is for consumer
or commercial purposes and regardless of whether the loan applica-
tion requires a fee. The business opportunity created by the appli-
140. Consequential damages that were not reasonably within the contemplation of the
parties at the time of contract formation could be recovered under a tort theory.
141. Negligence has thus far been applicable in the lender-borrower situation only
where the lender exerts a substantial degree of control over the borrower. See supra notes 20-
25 and accompanying text.
142. Liability had been previously imposed for lack of good faith in a commitment letter
situation. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
143. Unless a distinction is made between consumer and commercial loan transactions,
as suggested in this article, the rationale would apply equally to any business loan application.
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cant's submission is sufficient consideration to support the lender's
express and implied promises. Second, the rationale for imposing tort
liability is equally applicable to other loan application contexts. The
risk of liability is, therefore, increased by the Jacques ruling in all
loan application situations.
One defense to a complaint is the lender's compliance with the
standard of care; in other words, the specific loan was processed and
the eligibility determination made in accordance with the lender's
policies and procedures. Given the large number of loan applications
accepted and processed, however, there seems to be a statistical inev-
itability that something more is needed than the admonition: "Be
careful! Double check everything! Notify promptly! Review!"
One suggested measure against both a negligence claim and a
breach of contract claim is an exculpatory provision144 included on
the lending institution's loan application form. Maryland law allows
parties to expressly agree in advance that the defendant is under no.
obligation of care for the benefit of the plaintiff and that he shall not
be liable for the consequences of conduct which would otherwise be
negligent.14 There are, however, two exceptions to this general rule
which might render an exculpatory provision invalid. First, an excul-
patory clause is invalid if the relationship of the parties is such that
one party is at an obvious disadvantage in bargaining and the excul-
patory clause effectively puts him at the mercy of the other's negli-
gence. If all lenders adopt the same exculpatory provisions, this
would create an adhesion contract and raise a question of unconscio-
nability. One way to avoid this situation would be to offer the loan
applicant a choice of either signing the application with the clause or
paying an additional fee with an application without the clause. 1"
Those who could not afford the additional fee could, however, argue
that they had no real choice and that the clause should not be
enforced.
The second exception invalidates exculpatory provisions if they
are part of a transaction affected with a public interest. Winterstein
144. An exculpatory provision is an express waiver by the applicant of the right to sue
the lender in the event of negligent processing or a negligent eligibility determination.
145. Winterstein v. Wilcom, 16 Md. App. 130, 293 A.2d 821 (1972), held that an excul-
patory agreement in connection with use of a drag strip operated by defendant was not void as
against public policy.
146. In Boucher v. Riner, 68 Md. App. 539, 514 A.2d 485 (1986), a parachuting stu-
dent sued the instructor and the parachute school. The court held that the student was not
compelled to agree to waive his right to sue for negligence, since he had the option to pay an
additional fee if he chose not to waive his right to sue in the event of an accident involving the
negligence of the defendants.
LENDER LIABILITY
v. Wilcom 47 identified the factors to be considered in determining
whether a transaction is so affected by public interest as to invalidate
exculpatory provisions. Applying these factors148 to the case at hand,
it is clear that the process of lending money has some of these char-
acteristics. It is a business subject to regulation. It provides a service
of great importance to the public and is a matter of practical neces-
sity for the vast majority of the public. Few people are in a position
to pay the complete cash price for their homes, cars, major appli-
ances, or even their clothes. Lenders hold themselves out as willing
to loan to any qualified member of the public. The lender certainly
has a bargaining advantage over any member of the public seeking
the lender's services. The lender may or may not use a standardized
adhesion contract of exculpation and provide the option of paying an
additional reasonable fee to purchase protection against the lender's
negligence. It seems, therefore, that at least in consumer and resi-
dential mortgage loan application situations, the use of an exculpa-
tory clause is probably unenforceable.
VI. Conclusion
Implications for lenders from the Jacques case are self-evident.
To avoid liability, some care should be taken before a lender under-
takes to accept a loan application. Great care also should be taken in
processing the application, especially in documenting any reasons for
rejection or reservation. Since lenders are generally free to extend
credit to whomever they wish, rejections might be better justified
upon more subjective criteria. Again, documentation of these subjec-
147. 16 Md. App. 130, 293 A.2d 821 (1972).
148. The court lists the factors as follows:
[T]he attempted but invalid exemption involves a transaction which exhibits
some of or all of the following characteristics. It concerns a business of a type
generally thought suitable for public regulation. The party seeking exculpation is
engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public, which is often
a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public. The party holds
himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of the public who
seeks it, or at least for any member coming within certain established standards.
As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the
transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of
bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks his services. In
exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the public with a
standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby
a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against
negligence. Finally, as a result of the transaction, the person or property of the
purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to the risk of careless-
ness by the seller or his agents.
Id. at 137, quoting Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 60 Cal.2d 92, 98-101, 383 P.2d 441,
445-46, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 37-38 (1963).
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tive considerations is crucial. The potential for increased fees to
cover increased processing and insurance costs is likely.
